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Albert (1998) describes a number of visual displays that he uses to argue against current models of neon 
color spreading. He particularly emphasizes models which I and my colleagues have developed. He 
erroneously concludes that our models cannot explain the percepts that are generated by these displays. I 
am writing to set the record straight. 
His Figure Ia describes a well-known example of achromatic neon color spreading in Redies-Spillmann 
displays. This figure depicts a small light-gray cross on a darker-gray background. The cross has 
horizontal and vertical sides. The small cross is embedded within a larger cross whose sides, beyond the 
light-gray parts, are white. The image as a whole leads to a percept of neon color in which a circular gray 
disk intersects the four white-gray edges of the cross. The gray disk, which is formed by neon color 
spreading, seems to be darker than the light -gray cross. 
Albert claims that such percepts "provide strong evidence again a number of visual theories and models 
that offer explanations of the neon effect based on mechanisms that predict that assimilation will determine 
the direction of the brightness illusions seen in neon stimuli" (p. 844). In particular, he claims that our 
"theory also predicts that the target region [the neon disk] ... should appear brighter than the background 
(i.e., brightness assimilation), since the cross appears brighter than the surround" (p. 840). Albert 
correctly notes that our model predicts how a circular illusory contour forms between the four white-gray 
edges of the cross, and that the disk that is enclosed by this circular contour fills-in brightness values that 
are computed at positions within the boundaries of the light-gray cross. In this sense, our model is the type 
of assimilation model that Albert is criticizing. On the other hand, Albert does not describe the crucial 
property of how our model computes the brightness signal that gets filled in. Instead, he simply observes 
the percept of a brighter cross than neon disk, rather than describing how the model mechanistically 
explains the darker-gray that is actually filled in within the disk. He hereby confounds the percept with its 
cause. 
Later in the article, Albert acknowledges that our model has more structure than his critique based on his 
Figure I a might suggest. In particular, while discussing the model's presumed explanation of a percept 
involving the Kanizsa square (see his Figure 2), Albert claims that the model predicts "enhanced 
brightness signals (owing to edge contrast)" (p. 844). Thus, our "assimilation" model includes "contrast" 
mechanisms, which are the opposite of assimilation mechanisms. 
This is not a contradiction because our model, which has come to be called FACADE theory, describes 
several types of processing that occur in multiple processing stages. We pioneered models (e.g., Cohen 
and Grossberg, 1984; Grossberg, 1987a, 1987b; Grossberg and Mingolla, 1985a, 1985b, 1987) in which 
perceptual boundaries and surfaces are processed in parallel by the visual cortex. These boundary and 
surface systems are often called the Boundary Contour System and the Feature Contour System. FACADE 
theory attempts to explain how these boundary and surface systems interact to generate conscious 
percepts. Many data have since supported the hypothesis that separate boundary and surface systems exist; 
see, Grossberg (1994) for a review. Two of the most recent sets of experiments are those of Elder and 
Zucker (1998) and Rogers-Ramachandran and Ramachandran ( 1998). 
In the FACADE model, early filtering stages of the surface system preprocess image luminances and 
colors to discount the illuminant, and thereby contrast-enhance and contrast-normalize image luminance 
values. It is these transformed signals, rather than raw luminance values, that are filled in at later stages 
within boundary contours. In particular, "contrast" mechanisms operate in the model before "assimilation" 
due to filling-in occurs. 
The summary by Albert ( 1998) of how the FACADE model explains the percept in his Figure I a focused 
on boundary processing mechanisms; in fact, on only a subset of the relevant boundary mechanisms. But 
surface processing mechanisms are essential for drawing any conclusions about perceived brightness, 
since the FACADE model claims that boundary signals are perceptually invisible, or amodal, and that only 
surface representations carry visible brightness percepts. Hence, Albert could not, in principle, derive any 
conclusion from the model about brightness percepts from an analysis of boundary mechanisms alone; and 
his discussion of perceived brightness does not describe model mechanisms of surface processing. 
Albert makes other assertions that lead one to question his theoretical conclusions. For example, he cites 
data of Shapley and Reid (1986) about percepts of a display composed of two light-gray disks of equal 
luminance that are surrounded by two dark-gray annuli of equal luminance. One disk-annulus is seen on a 
black background and the other on a white background (sec his Figure 4). The disk on the black 
background appears to be brighter than the disk on the white background, even though both disks arc 
surrounded by identical annuli. Albert remarks that "similar mechanisms might underlie the brightness 
effects seen in neon color spreading and in Shapley and Reid's assimilation display" (p. 846) and that, 
"instead of a filling-in mechanism (e.g., Grossberg, 1994; Grossberg and Mingolla, 1985a) which 
spreads a total or absolute brightness signal, there might be mechanisms for filling-in brightness-
difference signals" (p. 848). In other words, Albert contrasts our "assimilation" model with a 
"brightness-difference" model that he claims may be able to explain his data. 
In fact, the simplest version of the FACADE model of surface brightness perception was used to simulate 
the Shapley and Reid (1986) percepts; see Grossberg and Todorovic (1988, Figure 13). This simulation 
was, moreover, reviewed as part of a model summary in Figure 17d of Grossberg ( 1994 ), to which Albert 
referred in his analysis. In addition, all computations of contrast-related phenomena in the FACADE 
model, from the beginning, have used brightness-difj(mmce signals; for example, see equations (A6) and 
(A 7) in Grossberg and Todorovic (1988), or equations ( 12) and (13) in Gove, Grossberg, and Mingolla 
(1995), another article which Albert discussed. Thus, Albert has drawn a totally erroneous portrait of our 
model's explanatory properties and implications from the very articles that he used to derive his critique. 
In addition, the 3-D version of the Redies-Spillmann percept in his Figure 1 a was explained in Grossberg 
(1994; see Figure 32), as was the 3-D version of the Kanizsa percept in his Figure 2 (see Grossberg, 
1994, Figure 34). The 2-D explanations can readily be derived from the harder 3-D cases. 
For completeness, I briefly summarize key aspects below about how FACADE theory may be used to 
explain the percepts described in Albert (1998). I focus on his Figure Ia for definiteness, notably on his 
claim that FACADE theory cannot explain how the filled-in disk can look darker than the gray cross. An 
important aspect of this explanation is that Figure 1 a generates a .figure-ground percept in which a filled-in 
transparent disk seems to hover above a partially occluded white cross. Unfortunately, Albert selectively 
uses only the simplest 2-D properties of these models, rather than the properties that are relevant to 
explaining figure-ground percepts. He thereby ignores the fact that a significant development of the model 
occurred between its original analyses of 2-D percepts, as in Grossberg and Mingolla ( 1985a), and its later 
analyses of figure-ground percepts, as in Grossberg (1987b, 1994, 1997) and thereafter; e.g., Grossberg 
and McLoughlin (1997) and Grossberg and Pessoa (1998). 
This enhanced FACADE model suggests how the 2-D image gives rise to a percept of two surface 
representations at slightly different perceived depths. The nearer representation includes the percept of the 
filled-in disk. The farther representation includes the percept of the background. The model explains how 
the nearer boundary representation generates a circular boundary between the four white-gray edges while 
inhibiting the cross boundaries near the interior of the circular boundary (see Figure Ia of this Comment). 
These broken boundaries are called end gaps. The model also explains how the .farther boundary 
representation generates boundaries that correspond to all the contours of the image (Figure 1 b). The 
critical point is the following: Within the nearer sur[c1ce representation, the four white-gray contrasts 
induce contrastive darkening responses, or "darkness buttons", within the circular boundary, using the 
model's "brightness-difference" mechanisms (Figure !c). These darkness buttons spread, or fill-in, their 
darkness throughout the disk interior. The (light gray)-(clark gray) edges between the cross and the 
background generate both brightening and darkening responses (brightness and darkness buttons) on 
opposite sides of the broken cross boundaries. But when these balanced brightening and darkening effects 
fill-in through the boundary gaps, they tend to cancel each other out (Figure lcl). Thus the net effect of all 
the "brightness-difference" inducers on the filled-in disk is a darkening effect, as in the percept. Gove, 
Grossberg, and Mingolla (1995) have analyzed how the "darkness buttons" due to the white-gray 
contrasts at the ends of the four white edges can generate a relatively large effect on perceived darkening of 
the disk. 
Figure 1 
Quite a different effect occurs within the farther sw:fclce representation. Here, the (light gray)-(dark gray) 
edges between the cross and the background generate brightness buttons within the cross and darkness 
buttons outside the cross. These effects fill-in within their respective cross or background regions, because 
the boundaries surrounding them do not have gaps. In addition, the white-gray inducers are inhibited 
within the farther surface representation by signals from the filled-in nearer surface representation; this 
latter property is a reflection of "the asymmetry between near and far". 
The net effect of these two processes is that the light gray cross can look brighter than the neon disk: the 
cross is brightened by the dark-gray background on its surface representation, while the disk is darkened 
by the white cross edges on its surface representation. Albert (1998) has made the mistake of assuming 
that all interactions within and between boundary and surface representations int1uence a single filling-in 
domain. The whole point of the model development in Grossberg (1987b, 1994, 1997) was, however, to 
begin to show how the brain may compute multiple boundary and surface representations in response to a 
2-D picture or 3-D scene. 
Reply to Albert's Reply 
Albert's response raises questions that are relevant to the evaluation of all models. His last paragraph 
acknowledges that FACADE theory may, in fact, be able to correctly explain neon brightness percepts, but 
then claims that my previous analyses of neon color spreading "incorrectly predict the brightness effects 
seen during neon color spreading". This seems to say that I did not understand how to correctly apply my 
own model to neon data. In reality, Albert is criticizing an earlier version of the model. The Grossberg and 
Mingolla ( 1985a) model could not explain brightness properties of neon that depend on figure-ground 
mechanisms. It used neon primarily as a tool to illustrate model 2-D mechanisms of our, then, new idea 
about how boundaries and surfaces interact. The later FACADE model generalized this analysis to 2-D and 
3-D figure-ground percepts. The 2-D neon examples described by Albert (1998) were not explanatory 
targets of the FACADE model in these later articles. The summaries that Albert claims "incorrectly predict" 
2-D neon brightness effects were either in the Grossberg and Mingolla (1985a) article, or in the 
introductory review sections of the Grossberg (1994, 1997) articles, where I used neon merely to illustrate 
how end cuts can influence filling-in, not to explain neon brightness percepts, before turning to the 
articles' true explanatory targets, which were new explanations of figure-ground data. For example, in 
Grossberg (1994), I analyzed figure-ground aspects of 3-D neon, using an analysis much like that of 
Figure 1, but did not focus on brightness as such. The very fact that a model has not yet been used to 
explain a particular phenomenon is not, however, a valid criterion for stating that the model is "incorrect". 
If it were, tben all models would be "incorrect", even with respect to data that they can explain, but have 
not yet been used to explain. 
Between January and June, 1999, Albert and I have exchanged almost 50 emails about these issues. I 
pointed out in these exchanges that he persistently quoted me out of context, and that the articles from 
which he selectively quoted could not have been trying to explain relative 2-D neon brightnesses, because 
they never gave an analysis of how the input image was filtered by illuminant-discounting mechanisms 
before it activated filling-in processes. Grossberg and Todorovic (1988) illustrate how such bottom-up 
filtering can dramatically alter a brightness percept. Without such an analysis, nothing can be concluded 
about relative brightnesses. All you can discuss is which surfaces fill-in. Albert seemed to acknowledge 
these concerns in a May 26, 1999 version of his Reply, but he wanted me to change my Comment to say 
that my earlier analyses were "incorrect". I could not do this, because it was not true. I was willing to say 
that they were "incomplete", because I had not tried to analyze neon relative brightnesses in these articles. 
So Albert has chosen to make this assertion, even though it is scientifically unsupportable. 
As noted above and in Albert's Reply, a key issue is the relative strength of the "darkness buttons" that 
create the darkening effect. Gove et a!. (1995) analyzed some mechanisms whereby brightness and 
darkness buttons become relatively strong, and illustrated this analysis with a 2-D simulation of the 
brightness enhancement that is perceived during the Ehrenstein illusion. 
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1. (a) Boundaries at the nearer depth have holes, called end gaps, where the cross abuts the 
inside of the circular illusory contour. (b) Boundaries at the farther depth exist at all edges 
of the figure. (c) Within the nearer surface representation, darkness buttons are formed on 
the inside of the circle due to the white-gray contrasts of the cross. Due to the end gaps in 
the boundaries of (a), the darkness buttons can induce filling-in of darkness throughout the 
disk. (d) Within the nearer surface representation, both brightness and darkness buttons are 
formed at the cross-background boundaries. They can cancel each other out by diffusing 
through the end gaps in the boundaries of (a). When these brightness and darkness buttons 
form within the farther surface representation, they are contained within the cross and 
background, respectively, by the complete boundaries of (b). 
